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Abstract
We utilize the exploration/exploitation framework to examine how a firm’s engagement 
in exploration influences its portfolio of external corporate venturing (ECV) activities. 
Three forms of equity-based ECV are considered: corporate venture capital investments, 
joint ventures, and acquisitions. The organizational learning literature is used to inves-
tigate how a firm’s engagement in exploration influences its usage of acquisitions rela-
tive to its overall portfolio of ECV activities. The investing firm’s industry technological 
dynamism is posited as a moderator of the relationship between exploration and the rel-
ative usage of acquisitions. Utilizing a sample of 1,326 firm-year observations between 
1996 and 2008, we find that exploration is positively related to the relative usage of ac-
quisitions, though this relationship is moderated by the investing firm’s industry tech-
nological dynamism.
Keywords: corporate venturing, corporate venture capital, exploration, environment
The processes by which firms search for knowledge to renew their strategies and adapt to 
their environments are a central component of the strategic management and corporate en-
trepreneurship literatures (Uotila, Maula, Keil, & Zahra, 2009). The most widely recognized 
form of knowledge search was explicated by March (1991), who proposed that firms pur-
sue learning either by exploiting current knowledge and “old certainties” or by engaging 
1
digitalcommons.unl.edu
2 T i T u s ,  H o u s e ,  & C o v i n  i n  J o u r n a l  o f  M a n a g e M e n t  (2015) 
in a more entrepreneurial process wherein new opportunities or knowledge domains are 
explored. Firms therefore engage in learning and knowledge search via processes of ex-
ploration or exploitation. 
Established firms often form relationships with entrepreneurial ventures to engage in 
knowledge-search processes (Schildt, Maula, & Keil, 2005). This practice is referred to as 
external corporate venturing (ECV) and is defined as “[firm] investments that facilitate 
the founding and/or growth of external businesses” (Covin & Miles, 2007: 183). A central 
consideration for firms engaged in external venturing relates to what form of venturing to 
pursue. Indeed, there are numerous modes of investment through which established firms 
may engage in ECV, though the most common equity-based forms include the acquisition 
of entrepreneurial ventures, corporate venture capital (CVC) investments—defined as mi-
nority equity investments made by an established firm in an entrepreneurial venture (Du-
shnitsky & Lenox, 2005a)—and the formation of new joint ventures (JV) by two or more 
firms. In other words, firms face a decision either to fully commit requisite resources to the 
venture by acquiring it via the assumption of a majority equity position or to partially com-
mit resources to the venture—via either investment (CVC) or by jointly forming the ven-
ture with another organization (JV). 
Despite an increasingly robust literature for each individual mode of external ventur-
ing, research has only recently started to investigate factors that influence choices among 
the external venturing modes and tends to utilize the real-options literature to focus on is-
sues relating to uncertainty (Tong & Li, 2011; van de Vrande, Vanhaverbeke, & Duysters, 
2009). Though the extant ECV mode-choice literature has generated many useful insights 
pertaining to when firms commit resources to ventures in the face of uncertainty, impor-
tant knowledge gaps persist. Specifically, prior work implies how exploratory search pro-
cesses influence venturing behaviors, but there has been no direct theorizing or testing of 
the relationship between search processes and ECV activity. Specifically, extant research 
emphasizes the exploratory outcomes of external venturing (e.g., Schildt et al., 2005; Wad-
hwa & Kotha, 2006) but does not examine the exploratory motivations for external ventur-
ing activities. The lack of direct theorizing and testing has led to competing implications 
regarding how exploratory learning influences venturing behaviors. Some research sug-
gests firms engaged in exploration are more likely to minimally invest their resources in 
the venture, which allows investing firms to create multiple flexible and reversible explor-
atory “options” that can be exercised at a future date for exploitative purposes, particularly 
in highly uncertain environments (Folta, 1998; Tong & Li, 2011). Other research, however, 
suggests that strong resource investments signal the parent’s commitment to the venture, 
thereby facilitating exploratory learning processes (Wadhwa & Basu, 2013). 
These contrasting propositions highlight a gap in the literature. Despite the frequent ac-
knowledgement that ECV activity is employed for exploratory learning purposes (see, for 
example, Cui & Kumar, 2012; Phene, Tallman, & Almeida, 2012; Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006), 
we know little regarding how a firm’s tendency to engage in exploration influences its ex-
ternal venturing mode decisions. The significance of this knowledge gap is notable because 
many firms explicitly state that learning objectives relating to novel technologies and op-
portunities, and not necessarily transactional efficiencies, are at the core of their venturing 
efforts (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005b). However, the untested assumption that exploration 
drives all ECV activities paints an inaccurate picture of how exploratory learning actually 
drives firm ECV behavior. 
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The purpose of this article is to address this knowledge gap by exploring the following 
research questions. Does a firm’s engagement in exploration influence its usage of acquisi-
tions relative to its total external venturing activities? In other words, does exploration in-
fluence a firm’s portfolio of external venturing activities? Research on this question may 
help clarify, for example, whether an emphasis on exploration is characteristically realized 
through spreading investments across multiple external venturing opportunities (the par-
tial commitment option, as discussed above) or concentrating investments in fewer or more 
resource-consuming opportunities (the full commitment option, as discussed above). Ei-
ther option may be chosen to enact exploration, but how do firms balance these options as 
a function of the degree to which they emphasize exploration? 
A second question addressed by this research is, does the technological dynamism faced 
by the investing firm moderate the relationship between exploration and ECV activity? 
This research question is motivated by the recognition that environmental exigencies play 
a crucial role in understanding how firms engage in and manifest their learning processes 
(Levinthal & March, 1993; Uotila et al., 2009) and make decisions relating to the extent to 
which a firm commits in its external venturing activities (Folta, 1998). Notably, environ-
mental uncertainty, as represented here by technological dynamism, is recognized by trans-
action costs theory (Williamson, 1975)—a theoretical lens herein employed to predict the 
relationships examined—as a principal determinant of whether firms internalize or exter-
nalize their transactions, of which ECV modes would be one form. Weber and Mayer (2014) 
note the importance of examining specific forms of environmental uncertainty, such as tech-
nological uncertainty—which we refer to as technological dynamism—when utilizing the 
transaction-costs economics (TCE) literature to study governance mode decisions. We ex-
plore the possibility that technological dynamism may enhance or attenuate the effects of 
exploration on particular ECV mode choices. 
We build on prior external venturing and organizational learning literatures by investi-
gating how learning drives ECV activity. We posit that exploration is positively related to 
the relative usage of acquisitions, because acquisitions are directly related to the absorp-
tion and subsequent usage of the target firm’s knowledge base and facilitate the timely ex-
ecution of learning objectives (Ahuja & Katila, 2001). However, we also suggest that indus-
try technological dynamism mitigates the attractiveness of acquisitions for firms engaged 
in exploration due to difficulties inherent in valuating investments in uncertain environ-
ments (Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993). 
This article makes several contributions to the corporate venturing and organizational 
learning literatures. First, we contribute to the ECV literature by going beyond demonstrat-
ing that exploration drives single external venturing activities to demonstrating that explo-
ration drives the balance of ECV mode choices. By exploring this issue directly, we facilitate 
future research on the interrelatedness of external venturing activities and partially answer 
the call to increase scholarship relating to examining multiple modes of external venturing 
concurrently (Tong & Li, 2011). Second, we contribute to the growing stream of research that 
recognizes that firms engage in multiple forms of venturing with multiple partners, which 
highlights the importance of considering external venturing activities as a portfolio rather 
than individual activities (van de Vrande, 2013). Finally, we contribute to the organizational 
learning literature by contextually situating a firm’s learning orientation, thereby facilitating 
the development of “boundary conditions” for the ubiquitous exploration/exploitation per-
spective (Danneels & Sethi, 2011). Specifically, we complement the exploration/exploitation 
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perspective with insights derived from TCE to examine how technological dynamism influ-
ences the ECV mode choices of firms with variously strong biases toward exploration. 
Hypotheses Development
External Corporate Venturing
The ECV literature has grown significantly over the past decade. Though many studies 
focus on one particular mode of venturing in isolation of others, there is a growing stream 
that considers multiple modes concurrently. Notably, the specific modes of venturing ex-
amined vary by study: acquisitions and CVC investments (Tong & Li, 2011); CVC invest-
ments and nonequity strategic alliances (Dushnitsky & Lavie, 2010; van de Vrande & Van-
haverbeke, 2013); CVC investments, nonequity alliances, JVs, and acquisitions (Keil, Maula, 
Schildt, & Zahra, 2008); and so on. Given the variety of modes considered, the selection of 
which modes to include in a study needs to be carefully considered. For the purposes of 
our research questions—that is, when a firm fully commits to a venture via an acquisition 
(assuming majority ownership) compared to partially committing (assuming partial own-
ership), either through a CVC investment or by jointly forming a new venture with another 
firm—the commitment of equity is central. In other words, the presence of ownership of 
the venture is a central consideration for our research. We therefore focus only on equity-
based forms of external venturing and do not include nonequity alliances. 
In our research model, we hypothesize the influence of exploration on the relative usage 
of acquisitions, that is, the extent to which acquisitions are utilized in relation to a firm’s to-
tal engagement in equity-based venturing. We focus on acquisitions because they represent 
“full commitment” to the venture—an unambiguous contrast to CVC investments or JVs. 
While CVC investments and JVs entail the assumption of equity in a venture, both have 
also been characterized as “options” that allow the investing firm to defer complete com-
mitment until, for example, uncertainty surrounding the venture is sufficiently resolved 
(Folta, 1998; Tong & Li, 2011). As noted by Tong and Li (2011: 661), “it is much more diffi-
cult to (acquire and then) divest a company than to liquidate a minority equity stake.” In-
deed, though JVs are typically thought of as representing more commitment than CVC in-
vestments, the commitment from the corporate parent remains “shared” in both instances, 
unlike the case with acquisitions. 
The Relationship Between Exploration and ECV Mode
The exploration/exploitation framework has been extensively utilized in past research 
on knowledge development and application (Bierly, Damanpour, & Santoro, 2009) and is a 
common lens through which external venturing activities are examined (Basu & Wadhwa, 
2013; Schildt et al., 2005). However, there is significant disagreement regarding specific fac-
ets of the exploration/exploitation framework. Some argue that exploration and exploita-
tion are orthogonal processes that may occur simultaneously, while others argue that the 
two forms of learning are anchors on a continuum such that firms have a relative focus on 
either exploration or exploitation (Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that there is general consensus on certain key points. 
First, exploitative activities are associated with local search processes, while exploratory 
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activities are associated with distant search processes (Levinthal & March, 1981). In other 
words, exploratory activities are utilized to alter a firm’s technological trajectory or broaden 
its knowledge base, while exploitative activities leverage or build upon a firm’s existing 
technological or knowledge base (Phene et al., 2012). Second, there is inherent tension be-
tween the two activities, particularly given limited resources to expend and limited oppor-
tunities to pursue (March, 1991). Finally, firms must pursue both processes to facilitate sur-
vival, and overengagement in one can be detrimental to a firm (Wang & Li, 2008). For the 
purposes of our research questions, we conceptualize and model exploration and exploita-
tion as learning processes that can occur concurrently. 
Though exploiting current knowledge bases and resources may motivate ventur-
ing activities (Phene et al., 2012), the corporate venturing literature tends to empha-
size the exploratory learning objectives associated with external venturing activities 
(Foss, Lyngsie, & Zahra, 2013; Hill & Birkinshaw, in press). For example, external ven-
turing serves as a means to alter or broaden the investing firm’s (also referred to as the 
parent firm) technological trajectory or to learn about novel and distant opportunities 
(Basu & Wadhwa, 2013; Keil, 2004). Exploration is proposed to influence CVC invest-
ments (Wadhwa & Basu, 2013), JVs (Cui & Kumar, 2012), and acquisitions (Phene et al., 
2012). Extant research indicates that forms of external venturing that entail lower lev-
els of commitment are more strongly linked to exploratory learning (Schildt et al., 2005) 
and the creation of pioneering technologies (van de Vrande, Vanhaverbeke, & Duys-
ters, 2011) than forms with higher levels of commitment. However, we posit that firms 
more strongly engaged in exploration will utilize acquisitions more frequently in their 
ECV portfolio than other firms. There are two major reasons why this is the case: com-
mitment and control. 
Within the context of CVC investments, Wadhwa and Basu (2013) suggest and find that 
external venturing characterized by high levels of exploration tend to entail greater resource 
commitment from the parent to the venture than external venturing characterized by mod-
erate levels of exploration. The authors propose that the greater commitment exhibited by a 
parent organization that invests more resources facilitates knowledge sharing between the 
venture and the parent firm. Similarly, we propose that firms engaged in exploration will 
signal their commitment to ventures by engaging in more acquisitions (relative to their ex-
ternal venturing portfolio) than firms exhibiting lower levels of exploration. The commit-
ment signaled to the external venture due to the acquisition will also encourage the devel-
opment of openness between the investing firm and the venture, which is a critical element 
in the transfer of knowledge from one firm to another (Inkpen, 2000). 
Second, acquisitions give the parent firm greater control over ventures than do CVC in-
vestments or JVs. Phene et al. (2012) found that greater levels of control by the acquiring 
firm over the acquisition target facilitates exploratory learning—contrary to the hypothe-
sis that greater target firm autonomy would facilitate more exploratory learning. The find-
ing that control facilitates exploratory learning resonates with the proposition that close 
social interaction facilitates the sharing of knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1992). Further, as 
noted by Grant (1996: 114), “transferring knowledge is not an efficient approach to integrat-
ing knowledge.” Directly acquiring an external venture will put the acquiring firm in direct 
control of what knowledge it will graft into its corporate body (Huber, 1991). 
Due to the level of commitment to a venture and control of the venture, we posit that 
firms engaged in exploration tend to acquire more frequently, relative to their overall 
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external venturing activities, than firms with lower levels of exploration. We therefore hy-
pothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between the degree of exploration and 
the relative usage of acquisitions within the portfolio of equity-based ECV investments. 
The Moderating Role of Technological Dynamism
Industries with high levels of R&D intensity characteristically exhibit technological dy-
namism (Uotila et al., 2009), manifested through frequent changes in technological norms 
and high resource demands focused on developing new technologies. In such industries, 
firms face uncertainty regarding what knowledge, capabilities, actors, and resources will 
prove most beneficial (Grant, 1996; Miller, 1979). Due to the importance of uncertainty to 
learning-related outcomes, technological dynamism plays a critical role in the organiza-
tional learning literature. Frequent changes in technological demands exert pressure on in-
cumbent firms to actively innovate and explore new technological opportunities and can 
increase the risks associated with exploiting current knowledge rather than exploring for 
new knowledge (Sahaym, Steensma, & Barden, 2010). As such, the risks associated with 
“sticking with what you know” are elevated in such contexts (Uotila et al., 2009). Con-
versely, technologically stable industries are easier to predict and enable mangers to “stick 
with what they know” due to a lack of pressure to update decision-making paradigms (Wu, 
Levitas, & Priem, 2005). 
The TCE literature provides insight regarding the influence of technological dynamism 
on a firm’s portfolio of ECV activities. When parent firms face high levels of environmen-
tal uncertainty, they are more likely to engage in arm’s-length organizational modes rather 
than hierarchical modes (Leiblein & Miller, 2003; Tong & Li, 2011; van de Vrande et al., 
2009). Folta (1998) indicates that the cost of commitment in technologically uncertain envi-
ronments—for example, commitment to a particular technology or knowledge base—may 
offset the savings in administrative costs offered by integrated modes. As noted by Leiblein 
and Miller (2003), uncertainty hinders a firm’s ability to forecast the value contribution of 
any particular activity, which makes high-commitment activities less attractive. 
Notably, different forms of uncertainty exert distinct pressures on governance mode se-
lection (Weber & Mayer, 2014). For example, Santoro and McGill (2005) found that part-
ner- or task-specific uncertainty increases the likelihood of hierarchical governance modes, 
while technological uncertainty decreases the likelihood of hierarchal governance modes. 
Flexibility in governance mode decisions is especially salient in the case of technological 
uncertainty due to the potential for technological obsolescence (Balakrishnan & Werner-
felt, 1986). Firms are therefore less likely to integrate an external business under conditions 
of technological uncertainty because doing so entails extensive resource commitment that 
is difficult and costly to reverse. 
Basu, Phelps, and Kotha (2011) found that firms in technologically intensive industries 
tend to make more CVC investments than firms in less technologically intensive industries. 
Similarly, Tong and Li (2011) found that firms are more likely to engage in CVC invest-
ments rather than acquisitions when technological uncertainty is high. These previously 
established direct effect relationships between uncertainty and external venturing mode 
suggest that technological uncertainty exerts an attenuating influence on the relationship 
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between exploration and the relative usage of acquisitions. Though firms strongly engaged 
in exploration may utilize acquisitions more frequently than firms less strongly engaged in 
exploration, we posit that technological dynamism negatively affects this relationship such 
that the relative use of acquisitions diminishes. The inherently unfamiliar and high-risk na-
ture of exploratory investments in technologically dynamic industries makes it difficult for 
the corporate parent to accurately evaluate relevant knowledge and assets, diminishing the 
incentive to acquire a venture (Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993). Firms engaged in exploration 
may therefore rely more heavily on forms of external venturing that require lower levels 
of commitment, that is, CVC investments or JVs. 
Indeed, the predominant logic in ECV research suggests that CVC investments allow 
investing firms to experiment with new capabilities and resources via the entrepreneurial 
venture to develop an understanding of future capability needs via “disembodied experi-
mentation” (Keil, Autio, & George, 2008). More recently, research has found that CVC in-
vestments may be a monitoring mechanism that directs a top management team’s attention 
to technological discontinuities (Maula, Keil, & Zahra, 2013). Additionally, technology-fo-
cused JVs tend to form in industries with high levels of technological uncertainty (Estrada, 
de la Fuente, & Martín-Cruz, 2010). Though JVs have traditionally been thought of as ex-
ploitative in nature (Koza & Lewin, 1998), more recent research on the technologically in-
tensive international pharmaceutical industry found that JV activities can lead to the intro-
duction of highly innovative product breakthroughs (Dunlap-Hinkler, Kotabe, & Mudambi, 
2010). We therefore hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the level of industry R&D intensity, the weaker the positive re-
lationship between the degree of exploration and the relative usage of acquisitions within 
the portfolio of equity-based ECV investments. 
Methods
Sample
The sample for this study is comprised of publicly traded U.S. firms venturing within 
the United States and engaged in acquisitions, the creation of JVs, or CVC investments be-
tween 1996 and 2008 in three broadly defined industries: information and communication 
technologies (ICT), chemicals, and medical and laboratory equipment. The three-digit Stan-
dard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes for these industries are as follows: ICT, 357, 366, 
367, 737; chemicals, 281, 282, 283, 286, 287, 289; medical and laboratory equipment, 384, 382. 
The sample was restricted to public U.S. firms due to data availability and because ventur-
ing may entail different motivations in the international context (Winters & Murfin, 1988). 
The industries were selected due to the ubiquity of ECV activities, providing an appropri-
ate sample in which to study ECV mode choice, and because their diverse nature provides 
variation on our industry-level construct. Accounting for missing data on key constructs, 
we determine that the total resulting sample is an unbalanced panel of 607 distinct firms 
and 1,326 firm-year observations. The mean and standard deviation for the parent firms’ 
net sales (in millions) are $9,227.10 and $20,976.67, for employees (in thousands) are 24.09 
and 46.47, and for net income (in millions) are $827.48 and $2,495.55. Figure 1 illustrates the 
total usage of each external venturing mode in our sample per year. 
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Data Sources
Data for this study were collected from several different sources. Data on venturing ac-
tivities were drawn from Thompson Financial’s Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum 
and VentureXpert databases. SDC Platinum contains data on acquisitions and alliances, and 
VentureXpert contains information on CVC investments. The COMPUSTAT North Amer-
ican Fundamentals Annual database was used for financial data of parent companies and 
for the industry technological dynamism variable. Data were also collected from 10-K re-
ports, which all publicly traded firms in the United States must file with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. 
Dependent Variable (DV): Relative Use of Acquisitions
Our research questions relate to why a firm engages in acquisitions relative to other eq-
uity-based forms of external venturing. As such, our DV is a firm’s usage of acquisitions 
relative to its overall external venturing activities, which also includes CVC investments or 
the formation of new JVs. Though prior work on ECV may also include nonequity alliances 
(Keil, Maula, et al., 2008; van de Vrande et al., 2009), we do not incorporate them into our 
study because we chose to focus exclusively on equity-related investments. Specifically, our 
research questions focus on why firms may partially commit to a venture (i.e., CVC invest-
ment or JV creation) as compared to fully committing to a venture (outright acquisition). 
In other words, we are interested in external venturing that involves equity investments 
Figure 1. Total Yearly External Corporate Venturing Activity. CVC = corporate venture capital; ECV 
= external corporate venturing; JV = joint venture. 
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rather than tie formation per se between two organizations. Notably, external venturing 
acquisitions are distinct from traditional M&A activity as ECV concerns the acquisition of 
young ventures by corporate parents rather than the acquisition of established firms (Ben-
son & Ziedonis, 2009). As such, targets for acquisitions are restricted to firms that are 10 
years old or younger at the time of acquisition, consistent with research on start-up ven-
tures (Yli Renko, Autio, & Sapienza, 2001). 
We calculate our DV by taking the total number of times firm i engaged in young ven-
ture acquisition in year t, adding 1 to that number, and then dividing that by the summa-
tion of 1 plus each mode of ECV activity for firm i in year t. For example, if firm i in year t 
acquired two ventures, created one JV, and made five CVC investments, then the relative 
use of acquisitions would equal (2 + 1)/[(2 + 1) + (1 + 1) + (5 + 1)] = 3/11 = 0.27. Adding 1 to 
each mode does not change the meaning of the relationships exhibited in a firm’s portfo-
lio of ECV activity; instead, it acts as transformation to improve the normal distribution of 
the variable (Wiseman, 2009). 
Independent Variables
Exploration — Exploration has been measured in numerous ways, including patent search 
scope and depth (Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Schildt et al., 2005), the extent to which the search 
process is both technologically and organizationally boundary spanning (Rosenkopf & 
Nerkar, 2001), and the importance of explorative and exploitative objectives to the orga-
nization (He & Wong, 2004). Our operationalization of exploration follows a method uti-
lized by Uotila et al. (2009) and is similar to the work of Vagnani (in press). We examine 
the degree of exploration expressed by the parent firm as assessed by its 10-K report. Spe-
cifically, we use computer-aided text analysis (CATA) of firm 10-K reports for each year 
in the sample. The 10-K reports contain discussion and analysis sections from the manage-
ment of the company where information regarding firm traits, as expressed by manage-
ment, can be gleaned. This analysis is therefore the degree of exploration expressed by the 
firm for all of its operations in a given year. Annual reports are considered an appropriate 
source of content analysis data, particularly in regard to a firm’s strategic posture or char-
acteristics (Short & Palmer, 2008), and have been used in the accounting (Neu, Warsame, & 
Pedwell, 1998) and business communication (Subramanian, Insley, & Blackwell, 1993) lit-
eratures. (For a more detailed discussion on the appropriateness of annual reports in con-
tent analysis, see Bowman, 1984.) 
Each 10-K report was processed through the CATA software program DICTION. DIC-
TION compares word usage in the text to the dictionary of interest. Word count scores are 
calculated and assigned on the basis of the word search. The dictionary utilized to calcu-
late exploration comes from March’s (1991: 71) description of exploration, including “things 
captured by terms such as search, variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, 
discovery, innovation.” The dictionary is based on the one provided and validated by Uo-
tila et al. (2009), who took key words from March’s description of exploration and exploi-
tation and used permutations of those words for their dictionary. Examples of phrases in-
dicative of exploration and exploitation are listed in Table 1. 
Our operationalization of exploration has unique advantages. First, content analysis “pro-
vides researchers with opportunities to unobtrusively study the values, sentiments, inten-
tions, and ideologies of managers generally inaccessible to researchers” (Morris, 1994: 903). 
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Second, content analysis may be useful for studying constructs that are difficult to assess 
otherwise (Duriau, Reger, & Pfarrer, 2007), which is a challenge faced by researchers try-
ing to assess exploration/exploitation issues. 
Industry technological dynamism — We measure industry technological dynamism at the 
level of the parent firm, as we are interested in how the environmental exigencies faced by 
the parent firm influence our main effect relationship. Industry technological dynamism 
is operationalized as an industry’s R&D intensity, measured as the ratio of R&D expendi-
tures to net sales for all firms in an industry at the four-digit SIC code level in a given year 
(Audretsch & Feldmann, 1996; Uotila et al., 2009). We collected data for this variable from 
the COMPUSTAT North America Fundamentals Annual database. 
Control Variables
Firm size is controlled for by taking the natural logarithm of sales. Profitability is con-
trolled for through return on assets, calculated by taking the ratio of net income to total as-
sets. Financial slack is therefore controlled for by taking the difference between current as-
sets and current liabilities (Bradley, Aldrich, Shepherd, & Wiklund, 2010). Firm leverage 
is controlled for by using the debt/equity ratio. The R&D intensity of the firm is also con-
trolled for by taking the ratio of R&D expenses to net sales. The total number of exploita-
tion words derived from the Uotila et al. (2009) dictionary are controlled for. The exploita-
tion dictionary comes from March’s (1991: 71) description of exploitation as “such things 
as refinement, choice, production, efficiency, selection, implementation, execution.” We 
also controlled for the total size of the 10-K document via the total number of words used 
in the document. 
To control for industry characteristics that may influence a firm’s usage of acquisi-
tions relative to other ECV modes beyond our explanatory variable of industry techno-
logical dynamism, we control for the parent firm’s industry’s capital intensity and com-
plexity. Industry capital intensity is operationalized as the yearly ratio of total assets to 
total sales in an industry at the four-digit SIC level. We measure complexity by regress-
ing the terminal-year (Year 5) market shares of firms in an industry (based on two-digit 
Table 1. Sample Exploration/Exploitation Phrases
Learning
Orientation  Sample Phrases
Exploration  “As a science-based, patient-focused organization, we discover and develop  
 innovative therapies to treat grievous illness.”
 “We develop and apply high-throughput experimentation to the discovery of  
 innovative materials for chemical, energy, electronics, life science, and other  
 industries.”
Exploitation  “Our ability to sustain and improve profit margins is largely dependent on our  
 ability to continue to improve the cost efficiency of our operations.”
 “The rapid execution necessary for the Company to fully exploit the market for  
 its products and services requires an effective planning and management  
 process.”
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SIC codes) on the same firms’ initial-year (Year 1) market shares. This measure is essen-
tially a trend toward or away from monopoly power in an industry over a 5-year period 
(Keats & Hitt, 1988). 
A 5-year window on previous ECV activity is used to control for each of the three exter-
nal venturing modes. The experience measure was decayed to account for the varying in-
fluence (for example) an acquisition in Year 5 would have compared to one in Year 2. The 
decay was calculated by dividing the specific ECV activity of (t – 1) by 1, dividing the spe-
cific ECV activity of (t – 2) by 2, dividing (t  – 3) by 3, and so on. These decayed scores are 
then summated to create a measure that accounts for previous EVC activities in the past 
5 years. We also controlled for total ECV activity in a given year by summating all three 
forms of external venturing by firm-year observation. Year dummies are used because cer-
tain forms of ECV may be more likely to occur in some years than others (Gompers, 2002) 
and to control for contemporaneous correlation (Certo & Semadeni, 2006). 
Finally, we controlled for two aspects of the venture receiving investment. We control 
for industry similarity between the parent and the venture by creating a match score be-
tween the parent and venture, similar to Schildt et al. (2005). Scores include 0, 0.25, 0.5, 
0.75, and 1, where a 1 is given if all four digits of the SIC codes match, a 0.75 is given if the 
first three digits match, and so on. We then created a yearly average based on the parent 
firm’s yearly venturing activities. Similarly, we created a yearly average for venture age. 
Due to our focus on the formation of new JVs, JVs were coded as 0 years old at the time of 
the venturing activity. 
Analytical Method and Results
Due to the fact that our sample is composed of firms that have self-selected into exter-
nal venturing activities, we conducted an econometric technique developed by Heckman 
(1979) and commonly used to correct for self-selection bias (Sampson, 2007). Briefly, this 
procedure allows us to create a control variable, referred to as the inverse Mills ratio, which 
results from an initial probit model that captures the decision to engage in any form of ex-
ternal venturing. The sample for this initial model is composed of all publicly traded firms 
in our focal industries during the sample period (N = 15,316, including the 611 firms in our 
study); we dummy coded firms that were engaged in any ECV activity as 1 (CVC invest-
ment, JV creation, and/or acquisition) and those that were not as 0. The variables we uti-
lized in the initial stage probit include firm employees, R&D expense, cash, total revenue, 
total assets, net sales, and net income. We then enter the inverse Mills ratio into our hy-
potheses-testing models, which corrects for the influence of self-selection bias (Leiblein, 
Reuer, & Dalsace, 2002). 
A Hausman test indicated that a fixed-effects specification is preferred over a random-
effects specification to control for unobserved heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 2010). We inves-
tigated for the presence of outliers (i.e., standardized residual > ±3 SD) that may influence 
our estimated models. We report our regression results with those outlier observations re-
moved (four firms and 10 firm-year observations), though our results are largely similar 
with the inclusion of the outlier observations. We standardized all variables prior to enter-
ing them into the regression equations (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003) and use ro-
bust standard errors. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for the variables used 
in the sample. Table 3 presents the results of the fixed-effect regression analyses. Model 1 
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contains the control variables, Model 2 contains the controls and the independent variables, 
and Model 3 contains control, independent, and interaction variables. 
The positive and significant (p  < .001) coefficient for the exploration variable in Model 2 
indicates support of Hypothesis 1, which posited that exploration has a positive relation-
ship with the relative use of acquisitions within the firm’s portfolio of equity-based ECV in-
vestments. The negative and significant (p < .001) coefficient for the Exploration × Industry 
R&D intensity interaction indicates support for Hypothesis 2, which stated that industry 
R&D intensity exerts a negative moderating influence on the relationship between explo-
ration and the relative use of acquisitions within the firm’s portfolio of equity-based ECV 
investments. We plot the significant interaction at ±2 standard deviations of technological 
Table 3. Fixed-Effects Regression Results (Dependent Variable: Relative Acquisition)
                                                                                    Model 1                      Model 2                    Model 3
Variable                                                                  β               SE              β              SE               β              SE
Capital intensity −0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01)
Industry complexity 0.02† (0.01) 0.02† (0.01) 0.02† (0.01)
Average industry relatedness 0.01** (0.00) 0.01** (0.00) 0.01* (0.00)
Average age of venture 0.13*** (0.02) 0.13*** (0.02) 0.13*** (0.02)
Debt/equity ratio −0.01* (0.00) −0.01* (0.00) −0.01* (0.00)
Sales (logged) −0.02 (0.02) −0.01 (0.02) −0.01 (0.02)
R&D intensity −0.09 (0.08) −0.08 (0.08) −0.08 (0.08)
ROA  −0.79 (1.20) −0.96 (1.36) −1.11 (1.40)
Financial slack −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00)
Total words 0.00 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01)
Exploitation 0.00 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) −0.01† (0.00)
Inverse Mills 0.03** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01)
CVC experience −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00)
JV experience −0.00 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01)
Acquisition experience 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00)
Total ECV activity −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01)
Industry R&D intensity   −0.02 (0.01) −0.02 (0.01)
Exploration   0.02** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01)
Exploration × Industry R&D intensity     −0.01*** (0.00)
Constant 0.35*** (0.02) 0.36*** (0.02) 0.37*** (0.02)
F 13.49***  13.53***  15.42***
R2 (Within) 0.525  0.536  0.543
R2 (Between) 0.605  0.591  0.585
R2 (Overall) 0.684  0.589  0.587
Log likelihood 1740.67  1756.57  1765.95
N = 1,326; number of firms = 607. Year dummies omitted for parsimony. Robust standard errors beside coeffi-
cients in parentheses. CVC = corporate venture capital; ECV = external corporate venturing; JV = joint venture; 
ROA = return on assets.
† p < .10
* p < .05
** p < .010
*** p < .001
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dynamism in Figure 2. Likelihood ratio tests indicated that model fit improved when we 
tested Model 1 to Model 2, and improved again when we compared Model 2 to Model 3. 
We further illustrate this interaction effect following Preacher, Curran, and Bauer (2006) 
in Figure 3. We show the average marginal effect of exploration on the relative usage of ac-
quisitions at varying levels of industry R&D intensity with a 95% confidence band. As Fig-
ure 3 shows, the moderation effect of industry R&D intensity on the exploration–relative 
acquisitions relationship is not significant beyond around +1 standard deviation above the 
mean. In other words, industry R&D intensity does not have a meaningful impact on the 
relationship between exploration and the relative usage of acquisitions within an ECV port-
folio for firms in highly technologically dynamic industries. 
Supplemental Analysis
In our sample of firms, there are 31 firm-year observations (28 firms) that exclusively use 
exploitation words and 29 firm-year observations (28 firms) that exclusively use explora-
tion words. Firms that exclusively use exploitation words tended to use few of them (have 
a low exploitation score), and firms that exclusively use exploration words tended to use 
few of them (have a low exploration score). To provide a greater understanding of the us-
age of each dictionary, we examined the descriptive statistics for a “relative exploration” 
measure, which is calculated as follows: exploration words/(exploration words + exploi-
tation words). The mean and standard deviation are 0.50 and 0.24, and the minimum and 
Figure 2. Interaction of Exploration and Industry R&D Intensity on the Relative Use of Acquisitions
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maximum are 0 and 1. In other words, most firms discuss both exploration and exploita-
tion, and few tend to discuss one to the exclusion of the other. 
We conducted two separate supplemental analyses to further parse the influence of ex-
ploration on ECV activity. Our ratio-based DV has upper and lower bounds (left and right 
censoring); examination of the minimum and maximum values of our DV indicates that the 
bounds are 0 and 0.8. We therefore conducted a Tobit regression analysis with upper and 
lower bounds specified. It is important to note that the Tobit analysis precludes us from uti-
lizing fixed-effects estimation, so we utilize a random-effects model instead. As such, the 
Tobit regression is utilized exclusively as a robustness check. Results of the Tobit regression 
analyses are supportive of our hypotheses in terms of both direction and significance of the 
independent variables (p < .05 and p < .001 for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, respectively). 
For our second form of supplemental analysis, we used the “venture deal” as the level 
of analysis rather than the corporate parent. We had a sample of 3,783 venture deals, which 
were labeled as CVC investment, JV, or acquisition. Due to the categorical nature of the 
ECV mode variable, we tested for the appropriate modeling technique: a rank-ordered ap-
proach (such as an ordered logit) or a categorical approach (such as a multinomial logit). 
We conducted an approximate likelihood ratio test discussed by Wolfe and Gould (1998) 
and a Wald test discussed by Brant (1990) to test the parallel regression assumption, which 
assumes that the relationship between each pair of outcome groups is the same. Consis-
tent with the work of van de Vrande et al. (2009), both tests indicated that the assumption 
Figure 3. Average Marginal Effect of Exploration on Relative Acquisitions at Varying Values of In-
dustry R&D Intensity
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was violated, suggesting that it is inappropriate to treat the DV as ordered. That is, these 
analyses indicated that within the current sample, the likelihood that a firm would engage 
in one of the three observed ECV modes was not significantly related to the likelihood that 
that firm had previously or concurrently engaged in another of the modes. We therefore 
used a multinomial logistic regression with robust standard errors. A multinomial logistic 
regression compares the likelihood of an outcome with each of the other outcomes (i.e., ac-
quisitions vs. CVC, acquisitions vs. JV, and CVC vs. JV). 
Results of this supplemental analysis indicate that exploration increases the likelihood 
of acquisitions versus JVs (p < .001) and also increases the likelihood of CVC investments 
versus JVs (p  < .001). Further, the interaction of exploration and industry technological dy-
namism decreases the likelihood of acquisitions versus either CVC investments (p < .05) or 
JVs (p  < .01). In other words, firms with high levels of exploration operating in technolog-
ically dynamic environments are more likely to engage in CVC investments or JVs rather 
than acquisitions. The interaction also decreases the likelihood of CVC investments vs. JV 
(p < .05). Overall, the supplemental analysis provides broad support for our hypotheses. 
Discussion
The ECV literature suggests that external venturing is a manifestation of exploratory be-
havior (Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006) and that certain forms of venturing are more likely to be 
related to exploratory rather than exploitative learning outcomes than others (Schildt et al., 
2005). In this article, we utilize the organizational learning literature to develop hypotheses 
regarding the influence of exploration on (a) the usage of acquisitions relative to a firm’s to-
tal equity-based ECV portfolio (including CVC investments and JVs) and (b) the moderat-
ing influence industry technological dynamism, as suggested by industry R&D intensity, 
exerts on the relationship between exploration and the relative use of acquisitions within 
the firm’s portfolio of equity-based ECV investments. 
Despite the common assumption that external venturing activities are motivated by ex-
ploratory learning objectives (Foss et al., 2013), this is the first study to explicitly test the 
influence of exploration on three different equity-based ECV modes. Prior work indicates 
that when firms engage in risky and uncertain interorganizational tie formation, they tend 
toward minimal commitment and flexible interorganizational arrangements (Folta, 1998; 
Schildt et al., 2005). This resonates with real-options logic, which has been utilized in sev-
eral external venturing studies to predict ECV mode engagement (Tong & Li, 2011; van de 
Vrande et al., 2009). However, our results contrast with this perspective, as we find that 
firms engaged in exploration—an inherently risky activity—tend to utilize acquisitions 
more frequently (relative to their overall ECV portfolio) than other firms. 
Consider the following from Google’s 2006 10-K report: 
Our experiments with targeted ads in new media also open up new inventory options to 
AdWords advertisers. With the acquisition of dMarc in February 2006 and YouTube in 
October 2006, we have broadened the distribution options for our advertisers. In addi-
tion, we have been testing ad placements in mobile search. 
This illustrates the exploratory nature of Google’s acquisitions in 2006, as it explicitly 
discusses experimenting with the advertising program via the acquisition of dMarc and 
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YouTube. That our results contrast with real-options logic furthers our proposition that ex-
plicitly testing the relationship between exploration and ECV activities yields novel insight. 
We therefore contribute to the external venturing literature by explicitly testing an assump-
tion that undergirds much of the literature. 
There are two implications of this finding. First, the relative usage of acquisitions for 
firms engaged in exploration is consistent with the view that strong resource investment 
from a parent signals commitment to the venture, which may facilitate knowledge transfer 
(Wadhwa & Basu, 2013). Indeed, acquisitions allow the parent firm to ingest new human 
capital, routines, and knowledge, thereby expediting the exploration process (Phene et al., 
2012). It is also interesting to note that while venturing activities may be motivated by ex-
ploitative learning motivations, our control variable for exploitation was not significant in 
Model 2, which tested the main effect relationship of exploration on the relative usage of ac-
quisitions. This suggests that, at least in our sample, exploration—not exploitation—is the 
learning motivation that drives the usage of acquisitions in an equity-based ECV portfolio. 
However, while our research indicates that acquisitions are used relatively more fre-
quently by firms engaged in exploration, our research does not investigate whether explor-
atory learning benefits are, in fact, realized. The external venturing literature indicates that 
acquisitions can facilitate the creation of pioneering technologies for the parent firm if the 
acquisition target possesses novel technology (van de Vrande et al., 2011). In other words, 
firms that acquire ventures with novel new technologies may be able to effectively tap those 
technologies for innovations of their own. If the target venture does not possess novel tech-
nologies, then acquisition activities do not facilitate the creation of pioneering technolo-
gies. This indicates that firms engaged in exploration may engage in acquisitions relatively 
more frequently because they are pursuing cutting-edge technologies and knowledge that 
could generate pioneering new technology, or alternatively, the exploratory learning ben-
efits they were after may rarely materialize. 
Our work also indicates that the level of technological dynamism is a key consideration 
when examining the external venturing activities of firms engaged in exploration. The rapid 
change in technological demands and expectations exerts pressure to adopt new knowl-
edge quickly. Drawing from the TCE premise that market exchanges are hazardous in un-
certain environments (Leiblein & Miller, 2003), we suggested that technologically dynamic 
environments will attenuate the influence of exploration on the relative use of acquisitions. 
As noted by Folta (1998) and Tong and Li (2011), when exogenous uncertainty rises, invest-
ment flexibility becomes more salient. Our findings are consistent with this extant work, as 
we found that technological dynamism exerts a negative moderating influence on the rela-
tionship between exploration and the relative usage of acquisitions within the firm’s port-
folio of equity-based ECV investments, such that firms engaged in exploration tend to uti-
lize acquisitions less frequently, relative to their total ECV activities, when they operate in 
technologically dynamic environments. 
It is important to note that our analysis of the average marginal effect of exploration on 
the relative usage of acquisitions, illustrated in Figure 3, indicates that the moderation effect 
of industry R&D intensity on the exploration–relative acquisitions relationship is not sig-
nificant beyond around +1 standard deviation above the mean (for the standardized score). 
This suggests that while technological dynamism exerts an attenuating effect on the explo-
ration–relative acquisitions relationship, the stronger effect relates to technological stability. 
Specifically, industry technological stability facilitates the relationship between exploration 
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and the relative usage of acquisitions. These findings help reconcile the contrast between 
our findings and the received wisdom in the ECV literature. In other words, our finding 
that exploration drives the relative usage of acquisitions in technologically stable environ-
ments is consistent with prior literature (Folta, 1998; Tong & Li, 2011). 
Our supplemental analysis provides further nuance by indicating that JVs are more likely 
than CVC investments for firms engaged in exploration in technologically dynamic envi-
ronments. A tight linkage between the parent and venture can facilitate the flow of knowl-
edge from the venture to the parent (Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996). The interorgani-
zational learning literature highlights the importance of resource commitment to learning, 
as resource commitment can help align the incentives of the parties (Santoro & McGill, 2005) 
and can help with partner commitment (Kang, Mahoney, & Tan, 2009). Within the context 
of technologically dynamic industries, JVs offer a unique combination of access to knowl-
edge stocks and the splitting of risk in the face of environmental uncertainty. As suggested 
by Siggelkow and Levinthal (2003: 666) in reference to exploring in high-change environ-
ments, “only firms that employ organizational features that both push the firm toward ex-
ploration and pull it toward stability tend to have high performance.” JVs represent such a 
mechanism that allows for stability through a purposefully built venture designed specif-
ically for the learning goals of the corporate parents. 
We therefore contribute to the organizational learning literature by complementing it 
with the TCE literature and demonstrating the relevance of environmental context to the 
venturing choices made by firms that emphasize exploratory learning. Specifically, our re-
search demonstrates how engagement in exploration exerts a different influence on exter-
nal venturing activities based on environmental conditions. While this research does not 
examine the effectiveness of various venturing modes, it does show that environmental con-
ditions can influence how a firm’s engagement in exploration influences its strategic activi-
ties. Thus, the current results underscore an important observation recently highlighted by 
Danneels and Sethi (2011), namely, that consideration of environmental context is a funda-
mental component to developing an understanding of organizational learning. 
Future Research and Limitations
There are several opportunities for future research that can extend this study and ad-
dress its limitations. First, since we chose to focus exclusively on equity-based external ven-
turing, we did not include nonequity alliances despite their usage in other ECV research 
(Keil, Maula, et al., 2008). Future research could address the challenge posed by equity ver-
sus nonequity relationships by explicitly articulating relevant differences between them and 
proposing methods to address the challenge. Second, the multitude of operationalizations 
for the exploration/exploitation presents both a challenge and opportunity. Our measure 
followed the textual analysis method utilized and validated by Uotila et al. (2009). Similar 
to the work of Palich, Cardinal, and Miller (2000), who reviewed how different measures 
of diversification influence the diversification-performance relationship, the learning liter-
ature would benefit from a comprehensive review and analysis of the different methods of 
measuring exploration/exploitation. 
Third, though we utilize a number of control variables to mitigate concerns of omitted-
variable bias, the possibility of such a bias has not been entirely eliminated. The firm fixed 
effect that we adopt accounts for unobserved heterogeneity for the corporate parent, though 
there are likely characteristics of the venture itself that are important (e.g., size, patent 
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portfolio, operating environment, etc.) and are not controlled for in this study. Future re-
search could focus more extensively on how characteristics of the venture influence the for-
mation of an external venturing relationship. Fourth, our operationalization of the DV as-
sumes comparability of acquisitions to CVC investments and JVs. This assumption aligns 
with prior ECV research (Keil, Maula, et al., 2008; van de Vrande et al., 2009), though we 
recognize that each form of external venturing is unique, and prudent caution is advised 
when comparing different forms of ECV. Finally, our findings indicate that the relative use 
of acquisitions is driven by a firm’s engagement in exploration. Interestingly, Ahuja and Ka-
tila (2001) found that organizations tend to overexplore or overexploit in their acquisition 
decisions. Future research could examine the possibility that while acquisitions are more 
strongly influenced by exploration, exploration-driven acquisitions within the ECV con-
text may have a negative impact on firm performance, and other forms of external ventur-
ing might be more appropriate. 
Conclusion
A firm’s engagement in learning plays a critical role in its utilization of different pro-
cesses to search for new opportunities. External corporate venturing activities are a means 
by which firms manifest their exploratory search processes and are practiced by established 
organizations that are powerful industry incumbents. Though research in ECV has exam-
ined antecedents to a particular form of venturing activity in isolation of other forms of 
venturing, antecedents to venturing activities as they relate to each other has only recently 
gained scholarly attention. This article attempts to further the understanding of both or-
ganizational learning and ECV by addressing this knowledge gap. Our findings indicate 
that in technologically dynamic environments, exploratory firms seek to maintain external 
venturing flexibility via CVC investments or JVs. However, when the environment is more 
certain—that is, when technological dynamism is low—firms tend to commit to their ex-
ternal venturing investments via acquisitions. While some prior research suggests that ex-
ploration is realized through acquisitions, and other research suggests that exploration is 
realized through less “committed” ECV options, such as CVC investments or JVs, both ob-
servations are, in fact, valid. The critical component missing in the literature is an under-
standing of how uncertainty affects an exploratory firm’s relative use of different external 
venturing options. Though venturing activities are utilized in distinct contexts and for dis-
tinct reasons, they are part of the strategic toolkit of some of the most innovative, forward-
looking companies seeking to be competitive in an ever-evolving landscape. 
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